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Draft Recommendation
on the WEU Militarl,Committee
The Assembll,.
(t) Strongll' endorsrng thc further dcvelopmcnt and rcinforcement of a European sccurrtv and
dcfence rdentrtl,rvhrch rs at the same trme thc European prllar wrthrn NATO.
(tr) Notrng. howcver, that the relatronshrp betrveen WEU and NATO on the one hand. and WEU
and the EU on thc other, and the extcnt of Europc's autonomy in the field of securrtv and dcfence strll
needs clanficatron;
|ri) Notrng that thcre ts a need to dcfine clcarlv to rvhat cxtcnt and rn u'hat respect WEU rs comple-
mentary to NATO.
(rv) Notrng that WEU's rattonale is bascd on rts capabilrty to deplol forces for a mrlitary, operatron
rn ordcr to protect the territorrcs and secuntl and defence interests of rts membcr states.
(v) Constdenng that Operatron Alba, rn u'hrch Eurofor-Euromarfor countnes plaved a prvotal rolc,
has sho*n that rn such cases raprd rntcrventron at an carl1, stage can prcvcnt a cnsls from becomrng
uncontrollable.
(w) Au'arc that such relativell,'small-scaie raprd rntervcntions mav onlv be surted to deal u'rth crrses
rn a limrted theatre m the lower range of Petersbcrg mlsslons for a penod of a ferr. months or less, s'hen
the nsk of rntcrferencc by' other adverse forces rs non-cxlstcnt,
(wr) Constdertng that dccisrons rn NATO to dcplov forccs, even rvhcre thrs concerns rmmedrate reac-
tton forces. are requrnng longer lead trmes than rn the past and rull requlre evcn longer lcad trmes rn the
future due to cnlargcment and the changed relatronshrp lvrth European non-member states, rncludrng
Russra.
(vrtr) Notrng that the tncluston of thc "double-hatted" status in the concept of "forces ansu'crablc to
WEU" (FAWEU) must not stand in the uav of thcrr rmmedratc avarlabrlrtv and therr operatronal capa-
bilrty' for possrblc raprd mterventrons b1'WEU,
(tx) Notrng that rt ts vttal for WEU to have relatrvclv small and flexrble but rmmedratell' avarlablc
forces at rts drsposal for operatrons u,here WEU acts u'rthout usrng NATO assets and capabrlrtres,
(x.) Consrdcrtng that such WEU forces should at least consrst of a multrnatronal hght rnfantrv drvr-
slon compnslng some l0 000 to I2 000 troops supportcd bY an alr componcnt provrdrng transport.
close atr support and rccorutalssance, and b1'naval forces berng assrgned marnlr to transport and escort
mrsslons.
(r,) Recalhng that thc avatlabtlttv of stratcgrc arr transport at short notlcc ls essentral for such
smaller rnten'entrons rvhrch arc tendrng to bccomc a pnman'WEU task.
(nt) Welcomrng the Councrl's decrsron to cstabhsh a Mrlrtarl, Commrttec and to reorganlss the mrh-
tary' structure at WEU headquarters and bnng rt under the authorrty' of a thrce-star gcneral/flag officer
tn order to reinforce and cmphasrse the rncrcased rmportancc of WEU's mrhtan componcnt,
(ntr) Noting that an agreement has not )'et becn reachcd concerning thc rclatronshrp bctu'een the Polrt-
rco-Mrlrtary Group and thc Mihtan' Delegates Commrttee urth rcgard to thc provrsron of harmonrsed
mrlrtarl'advrce to the Councrl.
(xrv) Consrdertng that thc cstabhshment of a Mrlrtan'Commrttec makes lrttlc sense rf thrs Commrttcc
rs not able to provtde the Councrl rvith advrce on mrlitan'and operatronal matters.
(xv) Constdenng that the advrce of the Mrlrtan' Committee should bc gn'en drrectll' to the Councrl
and stmultancousll' prcsentcd to thc Polrtrco-Mrlrtan, Group, whrch can take it rnto account ln lts
polrtrco-mrlrtary advrce to thc Councrl,
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(*,) Welcomrng thc dccisron to makc the Srtuation Centrc a mrlrtan, component undcr the authontl,
of the thn:c-star gcncral/flag officer.
(wtt) Emphasrsrng thc importance of thc lvork no\r,bcrng done to rcvrcrv the terms of refercnce of thc
Plannrng Cell and the Srtuation Ccntre,
(wur) Constdenng that after complction of this revlc\\'. the role of WEU's milrtarl,componcnts vrs-a-
vts the Europcan Union's prospectivc Policy Plannrng and Earll'Warnrng Unrt should bc dcfincd.
(xix) Regrettrng that the Satcllrtc Centrc ls not to becomc a mrlrtary component rvhrle undcrstandrng
that, under thc present clrcumstances, the current status of the Centre mav bc thc bcst possrblc guaran-
tee for rts firnctrorung,
(xx) Auare that the head of WEU's mrlrtary staff rvrll ensure close liarson rvrth the Satcllrte Centre
and lookrng fonvard to carly results of the Space Group's u,ork on the definrtion of relatrons betueen
the Satellrtc Centre and the Plannrng Ccll u'rth a vle\\' to enhancrng thc rolc and functionrng of each of
them.
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COTINCIL
I React morc quicklv and adequatell'to any future cnsrs rvherc it rs clear therc is a role for WEU,
2 Estabhsh an tmmedtate WEU rcactlon force consrstrng of a multrnatronal hght rnfantn, drvrsion
supported bv an air and naval component. al'arlable at very short notrce. rn ordcr to increase WEU's
complemcntarttr u'ith NATO and to makc the European secuntv and defcncc rdentrty visrble at the level
of mihtan'forces.
3 Ensure that the mandate of the WEU Mrlitary Commrttec also rncludcs thc task of assumrng
Milrtarl' Steenng Group functions ur support of thc WEU Councrl of Mrnrsters dunng rnten,ention
opcratlons.
4. Ensurc that the advtce of the Mrlrtan' Commrttee bc grven drrectlr to the Councrl and srmul-
taneouslY presentcd to the Polrtrco-Milrtarl' Group, rvhrch can take lt rnto account in rts polrtrco-military
advrce to thc Councrl.
5 Dcfine thc role of WEU's mtlttan' components vrs-a-vrs thc European Unron's prospcctlve Pohc1,
Plannrng and Earlr,' Warning Unit as soon as thc revrerv of thc terms of rcferencc of both the Plannrng
Ccll and thc Srtuation Centrc has bcen complcted,
6 Urge the Spacc Group, tn thc rvork rt has resumed on thc definrtron of relatrons betucen the
Plamrng Cell and the Satcllrte Ccntre. to makc provrsron for the closcst possrble hnks bctrieen thc tu'o
ruth a vlo\\' to enhancing the role and functronrng of each of thcm
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Exp lanator-y, Memoran du m
(submitted b), Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. Any' proposal to sct up a WEU Mrlrtary
Commrttee must first address the fact that to rc-
gard NATO and WEU as complementan' IS
meanrngful only'to thc extent that the trvo organt-
sations are comparablc In other tlords, evcn
though NATO's predommance ts at present un-
assailable and irreplaceable, WEU has to be
glven more mrlrtary credrbrlrtl' tn tts own rtght,
othenvise''complementary"' rvrll srmply' come to
mean "subordrnate" and WEU u'rll be a polrtical
organisatron u'rthout rndcpendent mrlrtary means.
forever doomed to sublectron to the decrstons of
others
2. There rs, hou'ever, no necd to crcate
WEU's Milrtary Commtttee rn the same image
and hkencss as that of NATO 
- 
for rt to be a
mere scaled-doua verslon of the latter It should
rather take on a ne\\. shape that allou's rt to offer
practrcal support to an,v actton adopted b1' the
WEU Councrl of Mrnrsters for the 
.yornt opcra-
trons of WEU member states
3 Vreu'ed rn thrs hght. a gurdrng prtnctplc
can be deduced from the follou'rng constdera-
trons Each member of an alhance complements
that alliancc rvhrle retamrng rts autonomv and rts
sovereign po\\'er of dectslon urthrn the overall
framervork. Hence although the purpose of the
sccuritv and defencc archttecture concetvcd at
Maastncht rs rn effect to burld a European ptllar
u'rthrn NATO that finds c\presslon rn a Euro-
pean securitl' and defence rdcntrtr' (ESDI). thrs
docs not alter the vahdrtv of WEU's fundamental
remlt to secure the defence of thc srgnaton' states
of the modrfied Brussels Trcatv
4 WEU s ven, abrlrty, to achteve, or regain.
autonomy and at the same trme be part of a
u,holc rull thus be thc measure of hou' far
Europe has achreved a true secuntl' and defcnce
rdentrty both rn rts affirmation of thc Organrsa-
tlon as a full-blooded rnstrtutron that carncs
substance and through the actrvc contrrbutron rt
therebl, makes to Europcan sccurrtv rvrthrn the
meanrng of Article J 4 of thc Maastncht Treatl'.
II. llEU's militarr- organisation
5 For a mrlrtary organtsatton to be cffectrvc.
rt nccds to have a clear dcfinrtron of rts tasks.
forccs assigned to it. a command structure and a
polrtrco-mrlrtarl' dccisron-takrng structurc Each
ofthese rssues rvrll be drscussed succtnctly'm the
present chapter. after a drscusston of thc exrstrng
polrtical context and recent expenence rn thc ficld
of European decrsion-taktng and opcratlons
(a) The political context
6 The fundamental notlon of a mrlrtan'
structurc's csscntral purposc rs that rt should be
the means of achieving the polrtrcal ends pursued
bi'thc rnstitutron from rvhrch rt cmanates. u'hrch
imphcs that the polrtrcal rnstitutron should ur rts
turn have sufficient rndcpcndcnt po\\er of dccr-
slon to be ablc to deplov the resources (mrlrtary
or othenvrse) that rt constders nccessan/ to
achreve those ends.
7 h rs therefore lmportant to understand and
define (or redefinc) corrcctll' uhat rs meant bv
complcmcntarrtv ln the relatronshtp bctueen
NATO and WEU srncc thc tcrm can be apphed
to rdeas that rangc from subordrnatron to combtn-
rng forccs
8 The ri'ording of Artrcle J 7 of thc Treatl of
Amstcrdam docs not pror,'tde a solutton to thrs
rssue and the status accorded to complementant\'
u'rll thereforc depend on the polrtrcal adeptness of
WEU mcmbers and therr dctermlnatlon to guar-
antcc and defcnd therr shared lntcrests through
thc use of the mrlrtary rnstrument avarlablc to
them under the modrfied Brussels Trcatv and
ensure rts compatrbrlrtr urth the NATO frame-
rvork as set out m thc Maastrrcht Treatv
9 The CJTF (combrncd 
.1ornt task forces)
concept cannot even bc constdered an enttrclv
safc proposltron slnce thc CJTF chatn of com-
mand, a tlprcal NATO command structurc, and
thc polrtrco-mrlitarl' dccrsion-maktng htcrarchl',
u'hrch devolvcs dounqards from the NAC
(North Atlantrc Councrl). have the effcct of en-
sunng that NATO assets made avarlablc m thts
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wa), to WEU strll remarn srgnrficantly depcndcnt
on SHAPE
i0 Thcrcfore although rt rs possrble to con-
cen'e of crrcumstances whcrc the CJTF conccpt
allorvs \\'EU to conduct a mrlitary opcratron u'tth
NATO assets undcr rts command, rt rs perhaps
no exaggeration to suggest that rf certain crttcrta
to be drscussed later tn more detarl, are not met,
thrs rvould merely' serve to entrench WEU's sub-
ordrnatron to NATO This u'ould appcar from
the outset to be a complcte travesty' of the notion
of complementarttv
(b) Recent experience
ll The Councrl of NATO defcnce mmisters
rssued the follou'rng statement at the close of
therr meetrng on 18 Decembcr 1996 '' \\'e arc
commrtted to ensunng the Alhance's effecttve-
ness, to strengtherung the transatlantic hnk, to
developrng the European sccurt[' and defcnce
identitr,(ESDI) u'rthm thc Alhance .'' Of these
ob.lectn'cs, developmcnt of the ESDI should be
placed firmlv at the hcad of WEU's hst of pn-
orrtres, rf onlr' for the sakc of consistency.
12 Notu'rthstandrng confirmatton of the above
statement rn reccnt NATO documents tncludtng
the Madnd communique of Jull' 1997 wherc the
seal rras set on Alhancc enlargement. rt should be
notcd that t\\'o sets of crrcumstances have tn the
meantrme scn'ed to make rt abundantlv clear that
Europe strll has a long u'a1' to go to find rts
European securltv and defence rdentrtl'
13 The first of these was thc conflrct m Bos-
nra and Herzegovina rvhtch. ln sprte of a porver-
ful European rnput. revealed the degrce to rvhrch
the Europcan lnrtratlve rr.as not compicmentary
but subordrnate to Unrted States actton. uhrch
uas also mstrumental ln organlslng the substan-
tral mrlrtan' operatron under NATO command
rrrth manr thrrd countrtcs partrcrpattng The
organrsational and polrtical reasons for thrs are
manv but rt should be noted that what ivas origi-
nally a hmrted conflrct graduallv gathcred
momentum at the r''ery heart of Europc Succcs-
srvc European tnten'cntions \\'erc unable to bnng
rt under control and the srtuatlon reached a stage
u.hrch u'as consrdercd totally unacccptable in the
e1'es of pubhc oplnlon before finall1' being re-
solvcd as a result of a decrsrvc Unrted States
rnrtrative. follou.cd by the dcployment of forergn
mrirtan'forccs under NATO command
14. Whcthcr NATO could have achrcvcd
anything wrthout European help rs debatable but
the rmpressron that remalns ls as descrrbed
above. decrsivc rntervcntron rn Bosnta has to a
far greater cxtent been under Unrted States rathcr
than Europcan control
15 The second event rias the crtsts in Albania
in spnng 1997. It secms beyond questron that
thrs rvas a turning polnt as mrlrtary tntervcntton
took place in a u'holl1' European context NATO
could even be crrtrcrsed in this rnstance for its
rndrfference or sceptlclsm
16 It is also ri'orth recalltng here that on 13
March, in the thick of the Albantan crtsts there-
fore, the WEU Assembll''s Standrng Commrttee
recommended that the WEU Council of Ministers
should " ask the Plannrng Cell to draw up
contingency' plans for possrblc operations in
Albanra covenng the full range of Petersberg
options, from humanrtarran and rescue tasks to
peacekeeprng tasks and peacemaktng, includrng
control over the restitutron of arms and munt-
tions"l
11 . Holever, for a varretl of reasons on
rvhrch rt rvould be futrle to go mto detarl, no spe-
crfic commitment u'as entered rnto by thc WEU
Councrl of Mmrsters ln response to thrs impor-
tant Assembll' recommcndation. although practr-
cal involvement br Europeans drd rn fact ensue
It rs rmportant to note the prvotal role plal,ed by
the Eurofor-Euromarfor countnes tn that tnter-
vention
l8 Thus uc can concludc. desprte all the
trusts and turns due to thc vcn' drfficult politrcal
sltuatron that prevarled. that betu'ecn the Bosntan
and Albanran cnses there uas a perceptrblc shrft
rn Europcan thrnkrng on cnsls management In
particular, tu'o neu' elements tn European dcct-
sion-takrng regardrng the crrsts tn Albanta u'ere
crucral rn helprng to bnng the emergmg cnsts
under control
- 
the estabhshment of a "coalitlon of thc
rn'ilhng". conslstlng of countrtcs that
were prcparcd to partrcrpatc tn an op-
eratton bascd on a Unrtcd Nations
mandatc.
Fwru essembll' Recommendatron 609 on the
srtuation in Albanra, adoptcd unanrmously by the
Standing Commrttce on l3 March I997.
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- 
thc raprd rntcrventron rvrth a mrlrtan'
forcc of hmited srze, deploved before
the crrsrs bccame uncontrollable
l9 If rt rs gcncralll,true of thrs t1,pe of opera-
tron that the rdeal solution takes trmc lvhrlc what
rs best does not ncccssarily dehvcr opcrational
and pohttcal effectrvencss in the short tcrm, then
we must accept, in future, that trmelr,, albert rm-
perfectly concerved rnterventron 
- 
rvhrch can also
mean substantial resource savings 
- 
rs preferablc
to rvartrng for broad consensus needing trme and
exhaustrve consultatron, thc protracted naturc of
u'hrch tends to mean that cnscs constantlv move
belond the range of onc's ability, to forcstall
them.
20. This krnd of small-scalc. raprd rnterventron
is, for thesc ven, reasons, effectrve and Albania
provrdes us urth an example of horv crises can at
least be contarned, rf not prevented. before mat-
ters reach a prtch rvhere more difficult and costly'
peace-enforcement operations havc to be rmple-
mcnted
2l Predrctablv at thrs 
.;uncture somebodv or
othcr u'rll takc frrght at thc rdea of securrtv be-
comlng regronahscd 
- 
ivith some 
.yustrficatlon
sincc raprd, small-scalc rntervention presupposes
that indrvrdual European countnes arc spared the
"opt rnlopt out" drlemma
22 Thrs partrcular fear, frequenth, invokcd rn
the past. has led to * evcn rmposed 
- 
a nccd to
seek consensual solutrons. u'rth the rnel'rtablc
delal' that thrs entails
23 On thc other hand rt rs clear that trmcly a
la carte rntcn'cntion ls more cffectn,e under ccr-
taln operatlonal condrtrons than operations 
- 
al-
bert carefullr planned and 
.;orntlr agrecd - that
take place aftcr the cvent. Opcratronal condrtrons
to u,hrch thrs tl'pe of rntervention mrght bc surted
are those u'herc thc arm is to tacklc cnsrs flash-
pornts x'rthrn a hmrtcd thcatre. agarnst forces that
arc poorll' organrsed and under conditrons u'hrch,
broadly speakrng, allou, rnterventlon to bc con-
fined to a penod of a feu' months or less Thrs
u'ould seem to suggest crrcumstances u'hcrc the
vested rnterests rnvolved arc relatrvelv fc*,, and
u'hcrc those urshrng to rntcrvenc can do so on the
assumptlon. not that uholesalc cooperatron u,rll
be forthcomrng from all concerncd, but rather
that they, x,rll not mcet u,ith anv advcrsc lntcr-
ventron from other quarters
24 Furthcrmorc thc rvorscnrng of a cnsls.
cven one ri'rth lrttlc rnrttal momentum. can ultr-
nratch, lead to Europcan and other countrrcs be-
comrng directll' and rnextncabll caught up rn
drsputes over uhrch thev hai'e no control. r'rhrch
could undcrmrne Europcan solidantl,
25 For those strll rn any doubt on thrs pornt rt
rs u'orth rccalhng that thc NATO enlargcment
proccss cffcctivclv marked a regronahsatron of
interests rvrthrn the Alhance 
- 
rvhrch rs a far
more srgnrficant development than defencc re-
gronahsatron 
- 
but u'rthout Alhance solidarity so
far berng called rnto questlon
26. To thrs mrght be added the consrderatron
that, accordrng to u'ell-estabhshcd practlce.
legitrmisatron of internatronal rntcrventlons no$
boils doun to approval b1'the Unrted Natrons 
- 
a
frameu,ork rn *hrch thcre s,rll. horr,cver, be no
.;ornt European reprcsentation rrrcspcctrvc of hou'
the Secuntv Councrl reform procccds Agree-
mcnt on a "European" course of actron can there-
fore be met onlv rn a specificalll, European
forum, partlcularh, rn rclatron to cnses rvhich, as
observed earlier, rcqulrc speedl, rathcr than
sophrstrcated forms of rntervcntron
(c) Tasks
27 . The possrble tasks of \[rEU u'ere drscusscd
in full rn Assembll'Documcnt l5l8 Hon'evcr, lt
ts u'orth rcpcatrng the paragraph rn thc Pctcrs-
berg Dcclaratron of 19 June 1992 uhrch statcd
"Apart from contributlng to the common
dcfenco rn accordance u'rth Artrcle 5 of thc
Washrngton Treatv and Artrcle V of thc
modrficd Brussels Trcatv rcspcctrvclr'.
mrlrtan' unrts of WEU mcmbcr states.
actrng undcr thc authorrtv of WEU. could
be emplol'ed for
humanrtanan and rescue tasks.
- 
pcacekecprng tasks.
- 
tasks of combat forces rn cnsls man-
agement, rncludrng peacekceprng "
28 It u'ould bc a tall order for WEU to
implcment thc full rangc of tasks m thc ncar
future. partrcularlv becausc of the Organtsatron's
hmrted operatronal capabrlrtrcs At the samc
ttme. rt should bc noted that rt has becomc com-
mon usagc to label onlv the thrce tasks mentroncd
at the end of the precedrng paragraph as Pctcrs-
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bcrg tasks The bcginning of thc paragraph
statcs clearl1,, hor.,r'ever, that mrlrtan, unrts of
WEU membcr statcs. actrng undcr the authorrtl,
of WEU. also contnbutc to thc corrrmon dcfcnce
rn accordancc u'rth Artrclc 5 of the Washrngton
Trcatl' and Artrclo V of the modified Brusscls
Treaty
29. Should rt in general be assumed that the
corrrmon dcfence of allied terntory rs the primarv
task of NATO? Thrs is one of the qucstrons that
necds clarrficatlon rf thc objectrve remalns u'ork-
able slmbiosrs betrveen the EU, NATO and
WEU
(i) I;orces
30 El'en'one rs a\\.are that there are forces
ansrverablc to WEU (FAWEU) As uas pornted
out rn Asscmbh' Documcnt 1518. the u,ord
''ansu'erable'' suggests a rather strong lnstrtu-
tronal and hrerarchcal link betrvecn such untts
and WEU. but thrs should be interpreted as "at
the drsposal of WEU" or "avarlablc on demand"
and not "assrgned to'', as rs thc case in NATO
x'rth the natronal armcd forces of its member
states
3 l In light of the great advantagc, as drs-
cussed abol'e. of raprd rntcrvention, there may be
an urgent nccd for WEU to revre\\. the notron of
"forccs ansrrerable to WEU" as accepted to date,
rn partrcular because of the ''double-hatting" of
these forces. uhrch presupposes an operatronal
readrness subordrnatc to NATO rcqurrements
NATO opcratronal forces are based. as is com-
mon kloxlcdge. on a tnpartrte structure compns-
rng Immedrate Reactron Forces (lRFs), Raprd
Rcactron Forces (RRFs) and Augmentatron
Forccs (AFs). u'hose rcmrt rs no longcr to dcal
urth threats that are rmmrnent or hkell' to mate-
nahse rn the short term Deplovmcnt of NATO
forces. even of Immedrate Reactron Forces, at
prcscnt requlres longer lead trmes for decrsron-
makrng than rn the past and rt rvill requrre even
longer lead trmes rn an enlargcd NATO Thus
the trmc it takes for NATO to rnten,ene rs qurte
hkcll'to lncrcase rather than dccreasc
32 Intcrventron b1' WEU u'rthout uslng
NATO assets and capabrlities rs supposed to
applv onlv to small-scale crises rn the European
theatre. rf thcre is to bc no duphcation wrth
NATO rt ri'rll be essentral for WEU to be opera-
tronallv rcadv for rmmediate deployment It
thereforc follous that rvhat rs rcqurrcd from
WEU forces rs not so much that thcl' should be
large and "ansu'erablc" but rathcr that the1,
should bc smaller and rmmcdratcll'availablc
33 At an inrtral rough estrmate, the availabil-
rtl' of a "vanable gcomctry" multrnatronal hght
infantrl, dn'rsron compnslng somc I0 000 to
I2 000 troops to take account of rndrvrdual coun-
tries' nght to opt rn or out mrght be an accept-
able startrng pornt for dcahng rrrth cnses on thc
scalc of thc Albanran cnsrs, or indced shghtly
morc extensrvc It is also clear that rmmedratc
rnterventron requlres a strategrc transport capa-
brlrtv The configuratron of such forces would
thereforc have to rncludc. apart from land forces,
adapted components of arr and especially naval
forces, rvrth the former provrdrng transport, close
arr support (CAS) and rcconnarssance (RECCE)
and naval forces berng assrgned marnly' to trans-
port and cscort mrsslons
(rt) Commands
34 So'eral recent Defcnce Commrttee reports
have discussed and sufficicntlv demonstrated that
WEU has norv estabhshed a full command
structure u'hrch u'ould enable rt to conduct op-
eratrons of a hmrtcd slze. as mentroned above,
u,rthout havrng to rclv on other organrsations A
casc-br'-case approach may' be the most appro-
prrate for appolntrng the operatrons commander
Whcrc staff rs conccrned. the frameu'ork-natron
s)'stem has proved most effectn'e rn multrnatronal
operatlons. rirth thc frameu'ork natron bcrng the
one makrng thc largest contrrbutron to the par-
trcular operatlon Horvever. there rs strll a necd
to envrsage expandrng the Plannrng Cell whrch
must be organrsed as a propcr opcratronal plan-
nrng headquarters. u'hrle marntalnlng rts links
w'rth NATO bodies
(n) The pohttco-mrlttary chatn o.f dectston
35 It must bc acknor.rlcdgcd that, at present.
thc hrghest polrtrcal decrsron-makrng body' of
WEU, the Council of Mrnrsters. grves thc rm-
presslon of bcrng able to operate only theore-
trcally' Qurte srmply. the lack of anv forccs that
WEU can deplov immedratclr unfaihngly' makes
WEU Councrl dccrsrons appear unttmcly'- etther
too earlv or too latc rn relatron thosc takcn in
NATO Not surpnsrnglv therefore. a pale
shadou of European coordrnation, the
"Eurodrnner" (thc rvorkrng drnncr ancnded by
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European defcnce nunrstcrs on thc elc of a
NATO Dcfcncc Plannrng Commrttcc mcctrng)
glvcs nsc to thc travcstl' of a prllar uhrch rs rtsclf
non-exrstcnt. glvcn that thc European forccs that
are meant to be thc malnstav of that prllar con-
stantll, farl to bc dcploy'ed
36 Clearly thcn, WEU erther takcs control of
the forces rihich are at rts drsposal in order to
intcrvcne rn situatrons falhng *'rthrn its rcmrt
(riithout u'cakcnrng NATO rn anv u'ar') thcrcbv
strengthenmg NATOMEU complementant\. or
remarns, to all appearances. ln a state of arrcsted
dcvelopment The u,ord "appearanccs" ls pertl-
ncnt rn thrs contcxt as thc rcalrtl of recent events
has sho*n that u,here needs must. and rvherc
support from statutory rnstrtutions ts lackrng.
spontaneous but effcctive a la carte auang;-
mcnts arc tendrng to der,clop, u'rth fcw' mlsgtv-
rngs ovcr WEU or rts non-cxrstcnt asscts
37 Gorng ahead srth thc rnitratrve to grvc
WEU substancc not onlv rmphes rcspectrng thc
sprnt and lettcr of the orrstrng treaties. rt also
mcans preventlng WEU. under prcssure of un-
ai'ordabie clrcumstanccs and as a rcsult of
equallv unavordable d lq carte decrsrons. turnrng
rnto somethrng qulte drffercnt to u'hat tt is at pre-
scnt Thrs last eventualrty could easrlv comc
about grven that rt rs strll vcn, drfficult to dcfine
rihat WEU's European defence role actuallv rs
38 Settrng up a WEU polrtico-milrtan' cham
of decrsion rs ln practlce sublect to a decrsron br,
the WEU Councrl of Mmrsters as to whrch Euro-
pean forces to opcrate u'rth Whatever thc out-
come. thrs much rs obvrous WEU's Mrlrtary
Commtttce, though rt mav escape an a la carte
formatron, could not rtself have a predcfined.
estabhshcd leadcrshrp evcn rf such rrerc callcd
for as the rcsult of somc NATO seal of
approval
39 Verl' hkel1, rt rs thrs samc bras m favour of
equalrtv among membcrs that is holdrng WEU
back Neverthelcss, pou'crful a brake though rt
rs, thc gatherlng momentum pushrng touards
coalrtrons. bccause of the number of crrses
loomrng over the horrzon. rs an equalll' effectrve
countcnverght It rs thcreforc up to WEU to dc-
crde uhethcr to prcss fonrard tou'ards a practrcal
goal or abandon the field to othcr forms of or-
ganrsatlon born of tangtble sltuatlons of common
danger
40 If WEU rs gorng to cstabhsh a N,lrlrtan
Commtttcc ur order to rcrnforcc rts mrlrtan com-
pononts. then thrs Commrttee should be more
than a consultatrvc bodt' for thc WEU Councrl of
Mtnrsters and should start actlng as a nrrlrtan'
interfacc In othcr uords. rn thc Nhlrtary
Commrttcc. thc WEU Councrl's polrtrcal rnstnrc-
trons rr,ould becomc mrlrtary rnstructrons for or-
ganrsing and trarnrng forces ahead of mrssions.
mrssion dcfinrtron and control and mrssron out-
comes
4l In thrs conncctlon. on the assumptron that
mlsslons undertakcn should bc small-scalc. for
rmmcdrate rmplcmentatron. utth operatronal
cvclcs of short duratron. rt mrght rcasonablr be
cxpectcd that WEU's Mrlrtan Commrttce should
have thc backrng of a plannrng staff. possrbll,
u'rth G2 and G-l (rntcllrgcncc and logrstrcs) com-
poncnts. a brgger ovcrall staff complemcnt than
that of thc prescnt Planxrng Ccll but urth posr-
trv'clv no cxpensrve. top-hcaw, implcatrons
42 On thrs assunlptron, WEU's Nfihtary
Commrttcc structurc mrght be srmrlar (but less
cumbersome than) NATO's Mrlrtary Commrttcc
x'lth each countn'havmg rts WEU mtlrtan' rcp-
rescntatlve attachcd to thc rclevant drplomatrc
bodr' (thc permanent reprcsentatron to WEU)
43 The Mrlrtary Commrttcc's tasks u'ould
csscntrallv rclate to
- 
asscssmcnt of the mrlrtan' srtuatron.
- 
draftrng lnstructrons for trarnrng. op-
eratronal and logrstrcal plannrng.
opcratronal control of thc lornt budgct.
- 
standardrsatlon and rnteroperabrlrtv
lneasu rcs.
- 
NATO-\ /EU mrlrtan' coordrnatron
measurcs.
- 
makrng rccomntcndatrons and requcsts
to thc WEU Councrl of Mrnrsters.
- 
assumlng Mrlrtarl' Steenng Group
functrons rn support of the WEU
Councrl of Mrnrsters durtng lnten'cn-
tron operatrons
44 As u'cll as off-hnc plannrng staff. the fol-
lou'tng should bc ansuerablc to WEU's N{rlrtan'
Commrttee the Thcatrc Commandcr apporntcd
for thc partrcular task. uho tn turn rrould appolnt
the Force Commander Thcsc tuo commandcrs.
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who cannot be permanent but u'ould bc choscn
on a case-br'-cas0 basls, could use thcrr ou'n staff
to provrde the frameu ork rn u hrch thc
multrnatronal forces contrrbuted bv WEU
mcmbcrs would operate
45 It vvould bc important too. for thc purpose
of grvrng substancc to thc European prllar. for
WEU's Milrtary Committee to rdentrf, an appro-
priatc spokcsman from urthin lts o$rl ranks lvho
u'ould har,'e a leadrng role rn the Commrttec and
u'ould act as rts mouthprece to convel' the posi-
trons of thc WEU CHODs rn NATO's Military
Commrttee
III. The l{EU Military Committee
(a) The general framework
46 At its meetrng rn Pans on 13 Mav 1997,
the WEU Councrl of Mrnrsters approvcd the pro-
posal of the Chrefs of Defcncc Staff (CHODs) to
clarrfr'and strengthen their role u'ithrn WEU and
to rmprove the functioning of thc Mrlrtarl' Dele-
gates Group (MDG) In accordance n'rth thrs
proposal. the Mrnrsters decided to cstabhsh. un-
dcr thc Councrl's authorrtr'. "a mrlrtan' commrt-
tce consrstrng of thc Chrefs of Defencc Staff rep-
resentcd. rn permanent session. b1' the Mrlrtan,
Dclcgatcs Group undcr a permanent Charrman".
47 The) furthcr rnstructed the Permancnt
Councrl to uork out thc dctarlcd rmplementation
of thrs decrsron Thcv also askcd thc Permanent
Councrl to studl all thc cnsulng rnstrtutronal
rmphcatrons and to prcscnt proposals to the ncxt
Mtntstenal Councrl for an,l furthcr adaptations
that mrght prove nccessary'. lvrthrn thc currcnt
polrtrco-mrlrtan' crlsrs-managemcnt arrangc-
ments
48 Thc marn reason for the Councrl's dccrsron
to cstabhsh a mrlrtan commlttee rras the gro\\,-
rng convrctron that the mrlrtary components of
WEU needed to be rernforced rf the Organlsatlon
\\as to grr,'c practrcal effect to rts operatronal
capabrlrtrcs In ordcr to emphasrse the rncrcased
lmportancc of WEU's mrlrtary component. lt \\'as
decrdcd that rt should bc headed bv a three-star
gcneral or flag officer
49 Aftcr thc Parrs mccting of thc WEU
Councrl. !anous uorkrng groups starlcd examin-
rng thc drfferent aspects of thc Councrl's dccrsion
to estabhsh a mrlrtary'commrttcc
50 Thc Councrl Workrng Group (CWG).
conslstlng of representatrves from natronal dclc-
gatlons to WEU rn Brussels, cxamrncd thc rnstr-
tutronal aspects The Polrtrco-Mrlrtan Group
(PMG), composed of national dclegates rcpre-
sentrng thc vrovs of both the polrtrcal and mrh-
tary authontres. examrned rn partrcular the rmph-
catrons of the Councrl's dectsron on cnsrs-man-
agcmcnt proccdurcs.
-51 At thc samc trmc. thc Mrlrtan Delegates
Group rvhrch rs composcd of thc milrtary' dele-
gates rcprescntrng thc Chicfs of Dcfcncc Staff,
further eramrncd the roles of the CHODs, the
functronrng of thc MDG and thc allocation of
rcsponsrbrlrtrcs betu'een the mrlrtary' componcnts
rvrthrn WEU hcadquarters
(b) The institutional aspccts
52 As noted above. the Councrl Workrng
Group (CWG) focused on the instrtutronal rmph-
catrons of the cstabhshment of a WEU Mrlrtan'
Commrttcc
53 In rts conciusrons, the CWG. said rt u'as
awarc that the estabhshment of the mrlrtan' com-
poncnts under thc authorrtl' of the three-star gcn-
cral/flag officcr outsrde thc Secretanat-General
should not altcr thc polrtrco-mrlrtan' character of
WEU as an rnstrtutron Nerther should thrs
pre.;udrcc thc functronrng of the exrstrng politrco-
mrlrtan, structures. such as thc Politico-Milrtan'
Group or the Polrtrco-Mrlrtan' Working Groupz
or creatc ncrr' problcms or delavs rn WEU's de-
cision-takrng proccss
54 The CWG furthcr noted that thc abovc-
mentroned three-star gcneral/flag officer u rll bc
the permancnt chairman of the Mrlrtary Dcle-
gatcs Group (the Mrlrtary Commrttcc ln pcrrna-
ncnt sosslon) conveyrng rts mrlrtan' adl'rce to thc
Councrl and. rf need bc. to other bodres. and that
hc ri.rll also provrdc advrce on mrlrtan'matters as
nccessarv to the Sccrctan'-General As thc drrec-
tor of WEU's mrlrtan components. he urll fur-
thcr bc rcsponsrble for their appropriate rnput
rth,r 
.*rkrng group rs responsrble for rnatters
relatrng to thc combrncd.;ornt task forccs (CJTF) and
for WEU's lollori-up to NATO's decrsron tn Berltn
in 1996 to strcngthcn thc Europcan securrtv and
defence rdcntrtr urthrn thc Alhancc
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rnto and effectrve partlclpatlon rn other WEU
bodies whrch are undcr thc drrcctron of thc
Council.
55. The CWG emphasrsed the rmportance of
clarrtl, and transparcncv ln thcsc matters u'hrch
was a reason for cnsurrng that harmonrsed advrce
based on purely mihtary consrdcratrons should be
made avarlable promptly, and rn parallel to all
WEU bodrcs conccrncd u'rth the management of
a cnsls, rn partrcular the PMG.
56 Thc CWG noted that the Satellrte Centre
u'rll not bccomc a mrlrtary component but that
the thrcc-star general/flag officer rvill ensurc
close harson rvrth rt It mentioned that the Spacc
Group had decrded to resume rts u,ork on the de-
finrtron of relatrons betrveen the Satellrte Centrc
and the Plannrng Cell.
57 It also noted that for reasons of clantv and
operational effrcrencr'. conscnsus had bccn
reached that the Situation Ccntrc should becomc
a mrlitan' component under thc authorrtv of the
three-star general/flag officer On the other
hand. the CWG rnsisted that as such, thc Srtua-
tton Centre u,ould contrnuc to opcrate under the
ultrmatc authont)' of the WEU Councrl x'hrch
u'ould alu,avs bc in a posrtion to assrgn general
or spccrfic tasks to the Centrc In the opinron of
thc CWG, the Councrl rvould alw'avs ensure full
acccss to and collaboratron betu'een the Srtuatron
Centre and other WEU bodres. such as the Secrc-
tan'-General and the PMG and PMWG, and
guarantcc the abrlrtv of the Srtuatron Centre to
plal rts role rn developrng coopcratlon urth othcr
relcvant institutrons such as thc EU and NATO
The CWG further noted that both rn normal
trmes and rn a crisrs the Srtuatron Ccntrc should
have the possrbrlrtl'to operatc rrrth a mrxed crv'rl
and mrlitan' staff and to rccelve and usc a urde
range of non-mrlrtary rnformatron
58 In rts conclusrons, the CWG notcd finallv
that a number of rssucs affcctrng the evolutron of
the mrlrtan' componcnts u,ould have to be clan-
ficd rn thc futurc, rncludrng a general revrew' of
the functronrng of thc Plannrng Cell, the terms of
referencc of thc Srtuatron Centre, the further de-
velopment of rclatrons rvrth NATO, and the role
of WEU mrlrtary components vis-a-vrs the Euro-
pcan Unron's prospectrve Pohcv Plannrng and
Early' Warnrng Unrt Anv rnstrtutronal rssucs
ansrng from these developments could bc cxam-
tned rn the CWG rn due course
(c) Consequences for crisis-munagement
procedurcs
59 The Polrtrco-Mrlrtary' Group focused rn
partrcular on the rmphcatrons of the estabhsh-
ment of a mrlrtary committee for WEU's cnsls-
management proccdurcs
60 In rts concluslons, the PMG emphasrsed
the drstrnctron bctu'een mrlrtary advrce, rvhich
w'as harmonrscd and formulated in the Military'
Dclegates Commrttcc (ie the Milrtary Com-
mrttee rn perrnancnt session) and pohtico-ml-
rlary advtce, rvhrch uas harmonrsed and form-
ulated rn the Polrtrco-Mrlrtan' Delegates Group
The PMG consrdered it of prrmarv lmportancc
that the establishment of thc Mrlrtary Commrttcc
and the related proposals for the allocatron of
responsrbrlities betu,een the mrlrtan' components
in WEU headquarters should not lcad to an
rnstrtutronalised separatron bct*ccn the polrtrcal
and mlitary sides of thc Organrsatron It should
rn no wav creatc ncrv comphcatrons and delal,s rn
the WEU decisron-takrng process but rather
lncrease WEU's efficrcncv ln cnsls management
6l In thc PMG's opinion, the exrstrng rvork-
rng relatrons of thc mrlrtarl, components rvrthrn
the polrtrco-mrlrtary structurc u'ould not be called
rnto qucstron It noted that contnbutrons b1,the
mrlrtan' components should remain avarlable for
thc PMG on a practrcal u'orkrng basrs both for
thc handhng of cnses and rn other phascs of rts
uork Thc PMG ri'tll recelve mrlrtan,advtcc from
thc MDC (thc Mrlrtan Commrttee rn permancnt
sessron). advrcc on mrlrtan' mattcrs from othcr
bodres such as thc Plannrng Cell and othcr forms
of support from the respectrve reprcsentatrves of
the military componcnts A maxrmum amount of
transparencv betuecn the drffercnt bodres u'as
consrdered to be absolutclt' csscntral
62 The PMG mcntroncd that rt uould rcmarn
responsrble for prepanng harmonrsed polrtrco-
mtlttan' advrcc for thc Councrl on contlngencv
plannrng. u,hrlc harmonrscd mrlitan, advrcc on
such plannrng rrould be provrdcd b1'the Mrlrtary
Commrttec As for the nomrnatron of the Pornt
of Contact bctu'cen the WEU Councrl and the
opcratlons commander of a WEU operation, thc
PMG notcd the agreement reached that thc three-
star gcncral/flag officer should, as a gencral rule,
IO
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act as thc Pornt of Contact dunng WEU mrlrtary
opcratlons and. rrhcn dcsrgnatcd by the Councrl.
for othcr opcratrons as ucll
63 No agrocmcnt $as reachcd concerning thc
rclatronshrp bctrvccn thc PMG and the MDC (thc
Milrtary Commrttee ln pcrrnancnt sessron) u'rth
regard to the provrsion of harmonrsed mrlrtary
advice Some thought that mrlitan'advicc should
be fonvarded drrecth' to the Councrl $'hrle the
PMG rias simultaneouslv rnformed, u'htle others
thought that mrlrtan' advrce should be fonvarded
to the Council vra the PMG. A third group was
of the opinion that the harmonised military' ad-
vice of the Mrlrtan' Commince should be givcn
directli' to the Councrl. but that the Councrl
u,ould onll,consrder lt oncc thc PMG had taken rt
lnto account rn rts polrtrco-milrtary advrce to the
Councrl
64 It should be notcd that srncc the Councrl's
dccrsron rn Lrsbon. rn N{a1' 199-5. to estabhsh a
Polrtrco-Mrlrtan'Group. thrs group has donc rm-
portant rrork for thc enhancemcnt of WEU's op-
eratronal capabrlrtres. rn particular rvtth regard to
the estabhshment of the Intelhgcncc Scction tn
the Plannrng Cell and of the Srtuation Ccntre
Thc PMG has also becn rnstrumental m discuss-
rng a number of ma.;or lssues regardrng WEU
operatlons rn former Yugoslavta The first part
of the 43rd amual report of the Councrl to thc
Assemblr (Document 1592) provrdes a full list
of actrvrtres of the PMG rn the first half of 1997.
This hst rncludes the follourng lssues
- 
crlsls rn the Great Lakes regron (at 28),
- 
srtuatron rn Albanra (at 28).
- 
follou-up to Cnsex 95-96 post-cxcr-
crse drscussron (at 28).
- 
WEU c\ercrsc poho (at 28).
- 
framcuork natron (at l8),
- 
lessons learncd rn former Yugoslavra
(at l8 and 28).
- Jornt use of trarnrng facrlrtres (at 28).
- 
WEU assrstance to humanttanan
landmrne ciearancc opcratlons (at 28);
- 
Afncan peacekeeping (at 28),
- .;ornt use of elements of multrnational
FAWEU (at l8)
65 Dunng that samc pcnod. thc Mrlrtan,
Delcgatcs Group conccntratcd on an cxamrnatron
of thc role of the CHODs. rts orm functronrng
and thc allocatron of rcsponsrbrlrtrcs bctu'ccn thc
mrlrtarl' componcnts rn WEU hcadquartcrs
Without spccrfl'rng. the first part of the abovc-
mentroned annual rcport mcntrons that "Further
rvork rncludod the provrsron of mrlrtarl, advrcc on
the framcuork natron concept and thc harmonr-
sation of cnsrs-management mechantsms and
procedures" Thrs demonstrates clearly. as notcd
rn an earlicr Defence Commrttee reportr, that the
PMG has partlv taken over thc rolc of the mrh-
tary delcgates rn the earher WEU configuratron
66. Obviousll'. the PMG feels uneasl, about
the estabhshment of a mrlrtarl' commrttee srncc rt
lvrll drmrnrsh rts orin role m the WEU structure,
rvhrch at prcscnt ls preponderant and all-
cmbracing
(d) The C'ouncil's decision at Erfurt
67 At thcrr mcctlng rn Erfurt on 18 Novcmbcr
1997, the WEU Mrnrstcrs
''Welcomcd thc progrcss achrer.'cd srncc
thcrr mectrng rn Pans. rn thc rmplcmcnta-
tron of therr decrsron to estabhsh a milrtan
commlttee of WEU Thev approved the
recommendatron of thc Permancnt Councrl
on thc rmplementation of the mrlrtan'
commlttee and the reorganisatron of the
mrlrtan' structure at WEU headquartcrs to
corncrde urth the rotatron of thc Dircctor
of thc Plannrng Cell rn 1998 Thel' noted
that the responsrbrlrtres of the mrlrtan'
commrltee as rcgards WEU's contnbutron
to NATO defcncc plannrng u'rll havc to bc
clarrfied "
ft) I'he Mthtort, (.omnuttec
68 It has bcen spccrficd that thc Mrlrtan
Commrttcc conslsts of thc Chrcfs of Dcfcncc
Staff (CHODs) rrho rrrll bc rcprcsentcd rn pcr-
mancnt sessron bv thc N{rlrtary Dclcgatcs
Commrttee (MDC) under a permanent charrman
(thc three-star gcneral/fl ag offi ccr)
69. The Mrlrtan'Commrttee rs the senror
mrlitarl'authontr rn \\'EU It \\ill be supported
' fn. op.*tronal organrsatron of WEU - Reply to
the fo(r'-first annual report of the Councrl. sub-
mitted on behalf of the Dcfence Committee by Mr
Schloten. Rapporteur (Assembli' Document l5l8)
II
DOCUN,IENI'I59I
b1' thc WEU mrlrtary staff (scc paragraphs 35
and follou,rng of thc prcscnt rcport) Thc Mrh-
tan' Comnuttcc comprrscs thc CI-lODs of thc
mcnrbcr. assocratc mcmbcr and obscrvcr statcs.
but tt mav mcct rn othcr configuratrons. rncludrng
assoclatc partncrs. on a case-bv-casc basrs and
mav also rnvrtc othcr partlclpants to takc part in
rclcvant u'ork As rs the prescnt practrcc, the
CHODs u'rll contrnuc to mcet tw'rcc a vear, ln
pnncrple before mrnrstenal meetrngs of the WEU
Councrl. and u'henevor nccessan' The CHODs
mectrng rs prepared and charred b1'the CHOD of
the member statc holdrng the Presrdeno' He
acts as spokesman for the Mrlrtary Committec on
all formal occasrons He convel's, u'hen appro-
pnate. the harmonrsed advrce of the Mrlrtan'
Commrttce The standrng charrman of thc MDC
u'rll partrcrpatc rn thcse meetmgs
70 To cnable thc Mrlrtan, Commrttce to op-
erate ln pcrmancnt scssron u-rth gcnurnc authorrty
to erprcss mrlrtary advrce. each CHOD rs to
nomlnatc a pcrmancnt mrlrtan' delcgatc to rcprc-
scnt hrm Whcn thc CHODs arc not ln scsslon,
thc MDC u'rll address mrlrtan' qucstrons on therr
bchalf
7 | Thc N{rlrtan' Commrltee u'rll be responsr-
blc to the \\rEU Council for thc gcneral conduct
of WEU's mrlrtan' affarrs It ri'rll partrcrpate rn
the polrtrco-mrlrtan' decrsron-takrng process in
WEU br provrdrng advrce on mrlrtary and
operatronal mancrs to the Councrl. based, as a
rulc. on consensus
72 As mcntroned carhcr rn thrs rcport. there
are strll drrergcnt vrexs on thc qucstron of
rihether the N{rlrtan'Commrttee can provrdc
mrlrtan advrcc to thc WEU Councrl 'drrectlr'.
uhrlc rnformrng thc PMG srmultancously'. or
onlv vra the PNlG
73 Thc cstablrshment of a mrlrtan' comnuttcc.
u'hrch rs mcant to clanf\' and strcngthcn the role
of thc CHODs urthrn WEU makcs lrttle scnsc rf
rts mrlrtan advrce can onlv rcach thc Councrl
after havrng becn drluted, adapted and rcproc-
essed rnto polrtrco-mrlrtan'advrce bv thc PMG
71. The marn responsrbrlrtrcs of the Mrlrtary
Commrttee are as follou,s
- 
to recommend to the WEU Councrl the
mrlitan' measures necessanf for thc
rmplementatron of Petcrsberg tasks.
- 
to drscLrss and dcvclop consohdatcd
vrc\\.s on WEU mrlrtan' rssucs and ad-
vrsc thc WEU Councrl accordrnglv,
to provrdc mrlrtan,advrcc as neccssan
on all mattcrs relatrng to forccs an-
sucrablc to WEU (FAWEU) and to
NATO asscts and capabrlrtrcs to be
transfcrred to WEU;
- 
to evaluatc plans, such as contlngencv
and operatlon plans, or subsequcnt
modrficatrons to alreadl' approved
plans, and provrde mrlitary advrce on
plans.
- 
to assrst rn thc provrsron of mrlitarl, in-
telhgence to WEU's relevant bodres
uhere approprratc.
- 
to e\ercrsc thc CHODs' prcrogatrvcs
drrfincd bv agrccd documcnts rn regard
to thc mandate of EurolonEcrma.
\\'ELGt and Eurocomu. takrng rnto ac-
count thc partrcular status of thcse
groups and WMWG7.
to partrcrpatc rn WEU's contrrbutron to
NATO's dcfcnce planning proccss and
provrde mrlrtan' advrce to the WEU
Councrl rn accordance rrrth modalrtres
to be determrned.
- 
to contnbute to strengthenrng the mrh-
tan coopcratron and consultatron pro-
cesses bets'ccn WEU and NATO, espe-
crallr u'hcn WEU-lcd operatrons usrng
NATO assets and capabrlrtrcs are berng
consrdercd or rmplemented.
t e*of,"lgtcrni ls a sub-group of thc Eurogroup
u'rth thc task ol do'cloprng long-tcrm opcratronal
doctrtnes and drawrng up spccrficatrons lor
armaments and cqurprncnt
' WELG Wcstcrn European Logrstrcs Group rs
concerncd urth logrstrc support for WEU opcratlons
At Erfurt. on 18 Novembe r 199'7 . thc Councrl
approrcd a Jornt Logrstrc Support Conccpt for WEU
rvhrch had bcen preparcd bl the WELG
o Eurocom rs a sub-group of the Eurogroup u'rth the
task of ensurrng that the varlous natronal
communrcatlons s\ stcms of WEU natlons mect
prevroush' fixed technrcal and operatronal
requlrcments allorvrng rnteroperabrlrty of the various
cqulpment tn sen'lce
" WMWG Western European Unron Mobrlrtl'
Workrng Group
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to formulatc mrlrtan' advtcc on cnsls
sltuatlons. cnabhng thc WEU Councrl
to takc dccrsrons to mount an operatton
and rmprovc thc arrangcmcnts for an
opcratlon ln progrcss rf ncccssan,, and
to dccrdc rvhen an opcratton should
end.
- 
to recommend to the WEU Councrl
mcasures rn order to improve thc op-
eratronal development of WEU;
- 
to task, noturthstandrng the WEU
Councrl's prerogattves, all military'
components of WEU headquarters
through the Director of thc Mrlitary
Structure and to rnform the WEU
Councrl accordmgh'
(r) 'l'he reorgarusatton o-f the mthtary slntclure
at WIiU headquarters
15 As a logrcal conscquence of thc Councrl's
dccrsron to cstabhsh a mrlrtarl' commtttec lvhrch
should reflect the rncreascd lmportancc of
WEU's mrlrtan' component, thc mrlitary struc-
ture at WEU headquarters had to bc reorganrsed
Decrsrons to that effect u'erc takcn at the WEU
Councrl's mrnrsterral mectrng at Erfurt on 18
Novcmber 1997 *rth the provtso that thts rcor-
ganrsatron should corncide u'rth thc rotation of
the Drrector of the Plannrng Cell rn 1998
The llE(t mhtary sta.ff
76 It uas decrded to set up, under the author-
rtv of thc WEU Councrl. a mtlttan' staff undcr a
three-star general/flag officer rn ordcr to ensure
greatcr cohcsron and strengthen tnternal relattons
betu'ccn thc mrlrtan'components rn WEU head-
quartcrs The WEU mrlrtan' staff u'rll constst of
the thrcc-star gencral/flag officer, hrs supportrng
staff, thc Plannrng Cell and thc Srtuatron Centre
'l'he three-star generalJlag fficer
11 Thc thrcc-star general/flag officer, acttng
undcr the authontv of the WEU Councrl, u'rll be
both permanent Charrman of the MDC and
Drrector of the WEU mrlttan' staff He urll have
hrs oun support staff. rn princrple u'tthtn extsttng
staff resources The post of this officer urll be a
non-quota post glven to a representative of the
mcmber states and replacing the current Director
of the Plannrng Cell on the existrng strength. It
rs noted here that the terms of rcfercncc of the
three-star gcneral/flag officer and hrs support
staff arc nou bcrng draftcd rn closc cooperatron
bctu'ccn thc Drrcctor of thc Plannrng Ccll and thc
Mrlrtary Dclcgatcs Group
78 lt gocs u'rthout sa\ rng that rn hrs capacrtv
as pcrrnancnt Charrman of thc IVhlrtan' Dclcgates
Commrttee (MDC). he *rll harc thc usual rc-
sponsrbrlrtrcs of the chatrmanshtp, rncludrng thc
fonvardrng of mrlrtarl advtcc on bchalf of the
MDC to the Permanent Councrl and kceprng thc
Secretary'-General rnformed of tssues berng drs-
cussed rn the MDC
79. The permanent Charrman of the MDC u'rll
also ensurc that addrtronal rnformatton on thc
mrlrtan' advrce put fonvard bv the Mrlitarl'
Commrttee u'rll be communrcatcd to WEU
bodrcs, rn partrcular thc PN'lG and PI\AVG,
uhcrc necessan' Frnallr'. hc urll act as the
MDC's spokesman and rcport to thc WEU
Councrl and/or the Mrlrtan' Commtttee on thc
u'ork of the MDC
80 In hrs capacrtv as Drrcctor of thc WEU
mrlrtarl'staff, thc thrcc-star gcncral/flag officer rs
ansu'erablc to thc WEU Councrl Among manv
othcr thrngs, he rs responsrblc for thc rmplcmcn-
tatron of decrsrons takcn and drrectrves rssued bv
the WEU Councrl and bv the N{rlrtary Commrt-
tee The Drrector u'rll also asstst the Secretary-
General rn carn'rng out WEU Councrl dectstons,
plan for WEU operatrons and exercrses and pre-
pare studres and u'ork tn the mtlttary' ficld
81 As regards relatrons ri rth NATO and thc
EU. hc rs rcsponsrble for
- 
ensurtng tntcrfaces and coordtnatton
u'rth NATO's N'hlrtan Commtttee and
mrlrtan'command stnlcturc. at the ap-
propnatc lcvcls.
- 
drau'rng on NATO suppoft as agrecd
bctu'een WEU and NATO.
cnsunng the erchangc of rntlrtary tn-
formatron and documcnts as agrced
bctuecn WEU and NATO.
- 
ensunng the erchangc of mtlttary tn-
formatron and documents as agrecd
betu'een WEU and the EU
82 Dunng WEU mrlrtan opcratrons and,
rvhen designated b1' the WEU Councrl for othcr
operatlons, the Drrector of thc WEU mrlrtary
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staff urll. as a gcncral rulc. act as thc Pornt of
Contact
83 It has bccn notcd earhcr that 
- 
rathcr
rllogrcalll 
- 
thc Satcllrte Centrc r"'rll not bccomc
a mrlrtan' componcnt of WEU The Drrcctor of
the WEU mrlrtan' staff u'rll thcrefore bc respon-
srble for cnsunng closc harson rvrth thc Satcllrte
Ccntre rn thc framervork of the Councrl's
drrcctives to the Centre
84 It should be remembercd that the WEU
Space Group has decided to resume rts *'ork on
the definrtron of relatrons betrveen the Satellrte
Ccntre and the Plannrng Cell
I'he Plannrng CeLl
8-5 The Plannrng Cell and rts uork have bccn
drscussed cxtcnsrvclv rn carher rcports of thc
Defence Commrtteos In ordcr to adapt rts rolc
and actrl'rtrcs to ne$' ctrcumstances. thc WEU
Councrl and thc CHODs havc mandatcd w'ork on
thc terms of rcfcrcnce and future rolc of thc
Plannrng Cell
86 In the reorganrsed mrlrtary structure. the
Plannrng Cell u.rll contrnue to be the mrlrtan'
plannrng staff of WEU, u'hrch rs responsrble for
the rmplementatlon of policres and dectsrons as
drrected In addrtron. the Plannrng Cell prepares
plans, carnes out studres and rccommends pohcv
on matters of an operatronal nature referred to
WEU
87 The Plannrng Ccll urll be headcd bv a onc-
star officer as rts Drrcctor Thrs post u'rl[ bc a
non-quota post gl!'cn to a rcprcsentatlvc of thc
mcmbcr statcs and replacrng the currcnt Deputv
Drrcctor of the Plannrng Ccll on thc crrstrng
strcngth
88 The Drrcctor of thc Plannrng Ccll acts
undcr the authorrtv of the threc-star general/flag
t S.. ,. partrcular 
- 
The \\EU Plannrng Cell.
repo( submrtted on behalf of the Defence Commrttee
b1' Mrs Baan'eld-Schlaman, Rappo(eur, Assemblv
Document l.l2l
- 
The operatronal organrsatron of WEU 
- 
Reph' to
the fory'-first annual report of thc Council. rcport
submitted on behalf of the Dcfcnce Commrttcc b1, Mr
Schlotcn, Rapporteur, Asscmbly Document 1518
officcr, supports hrm rn hrs capacrtrcs as Drrsctor
of thc WEU mrlrtan' staff and pcrmancnt Charr-
man of thc NIDC ln carnrng out hrs rcsponsrbrh-
trcs vrs-a-r,'rs thc WEU Councrl and thc Mrlrtary
Commrttcc. and drrccts thc Planning Ccll In thc
abscnco of thc threc-star gcncral/flag officcr. hc
rvrll represcnt hrm as tho Drrcctor of thc WEU
mrlrtan'staff
The Stlualron Centre
89 The Srtuatron Ccntre, u,hrch m the exrstrng
structure operates undcr the authorrty of thc Sec-
rctan'-Gcneral, u-rll 
- 
after the reorganisatlon 
-
act undcr the authontv of the three-star gen-
erallflag officer It rs strpulated, how,ever, that rn
thc neu' structure thc Sccretan,-General can strll
avarl hrmself of thc Srtuatron Ccntre The Srtua-
tron Centrc. rn closc coopcratron ri,ith the Plan-
nrng Cell. urll monrtor thc srtuatlon tn crrsts
arcas desrgnatcd b1'thc WEU Councrl as u,cll as
tire progrcss of \\/EU opcratlons It lvrll also
support thc appropnatc rvorkrng groups rn thc
preparatlon of \\/EU Councrl dccisrons on cnsts
managcment and polrtrco-mrlrtary, control of op-
eratlons
Il'. Conclusions
90 A studl'usuallv starts b),definrng rts arms
Here. hou'ever. \\.c havc left it to the last before
revealrng our hand and makrng clear that if the
rntentron rs for WEU's N,hlrtary Commrttcc to be
a srnecurc for gencrals from the various WEU
countnes. thrngs can bc lcft as the)' stand rn thc
certarn knorr lcdgc that thc Committec utll start
mcetrng and rrrll do no morc damage than manv
othcr such bodrcs uc could mcntron It rs qurtc
another mattcr to sav trhcthcr rt rvrll be uscful to
WEU. cnhancc lts tmagc. strcngthcn its actron or
nrakc rt complcmcntan to NATO 
- 
complemcn-
tan. not subordrnatc
9l If such ls our arm. then we must clearll,
rdentrf\' the forces WEU can rel1, on, houcver
small. hou'ever lrmrtcd therr tasks It has been
suggested in thc prescnt rcport that an immediate
rcactlon force consrstrng of l0 000 to 12 000
troops and rncludrng arr and nal'al components is
best surted to the purpose Others may have drf-
ferent vreu's Houever the fact remains that
WEU forces and WEU's Milrtary Commrttee are
but tuo faccts of the same problem
I4
TMPRTMERIE iil er-eNEoNNAISE
Rue Edouard-Belin : 4' trrmestre 1997
N'd'ordre : -10641
PRINTED IN FRANCE



